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Sincere Exchanges, Not Fabricated Neutrality:
A Response to Mark Piper
G. M. Trujillo, Jr.
Vanderbilt University Philosophy Department
Mark Piper (2019) accomplishes the impossible in “Struggling for Clarity
on Well-Being.” He sets up a programmatic paper in under 3000 words,
and he insightfully engages speciﬁc theories despite aporia. Piper argues
that contemporary debates on well-being are stalemated, largely because
no one clariﬁes “well-being,” “goodness for,” or “prudential goodness.”1
This ambiguity breeds monsters, especially a bull that can aim its horns at
every well-being theorist. One horn aims at philosophers who abstractly
characterize prudential goodness to speak to all theories of well-being;
their ﬂimsy deﬁnitions get shredded due to ambiguity and unhelpfulness.
The other horn aims at philosophers who explicitly stipulate deﬁnitions
of prudential goodness by loading them with concrete norms; these
philosophers get eviscerated and trampled under the weight of their own
assumptions.2 Piper laments the gore of the literature. And although he
ends his paper without resolution, he preserves hope for a better deﬁnition
of prudential goodness. He hopes for a deﬁnition that avoids both abstract
cloudiness and stipulative muddiness.
But I want to challenge Piper on this dilemma. I agree that the bull
in the labyrinth of the well-being literature has one sharp horn. It really
does gut philosophers who ﬂee difﬁculties via excess abstraction. But the
other horn, aimed against stipulative philosophers, is blunted. Substantive
discussions about well-being may not provide a neutral ground that
all debaters can occupy. But that’s not a vice. If any discussions are
unavoidably normative, ones about well-being are, and their normative
heft shouldn’t weigh against them.3
In fact, theoretical neutrality isn’t needed in moral, ethical, political,
or prudential conversations. Rather, open exchange is. And exchange
doesn’t depend on moral, ethical, political, prudential, or even ontological
impartiality. It just requires that we understand ourselves and others, and
communicate clearly and fairly. Piper fails to acknowledge one crucial
assumption: he implies that exactly one theory of well-being is correct
or better than all alternatives. This precludes mixed ideas and multiple
truths.4 Especially in practical domains, it’s more likely that many theories
will adequately describe the phenomena of well-being, and many theories
will lead people to live well. Given the probability of this plurality,
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neutrality seems all the more puzzling. Neutrality is a mirage, fooling
especially philosophers who yearn for a transcendental sun to elucidate
earthly mires. But those securely on earth—boiling crawﬁsh in the bayou
and singing about our troubles behind a beat—understand that there is
no neutral ground, no way out of the mire, and that’s OK. Such a harsh,
transcendental sun would desiccate the supple and delicate details of
everyday moral life anyway.5
Rather than condemning stipulation, we can cast it as careful, overt
consideration of our own standards. When we make ourselves vulnerable
by revealing our sincere and lived commitments, we can make sense of
the gorgeous, hideous, ecstatic, and miserable components of our lives
that we must integrate into our uniﬁed narratives.6 Stipulation, if done
for scrutiny of one’s sincerely held beliefs, is valiantly honest. And if this
stipulation is partnered with openness toward alternatives and good faith
efforts to expose our own weaknesses and buttress them, then there are
no theoretical or practical downsides. The myriad theories about wellbeing or goodness don’t conceal the fact that we can’t avoid assuming
a speciﬁc theory in our everyday lives at any given moment. Our most
valued objective goods or subjective experiences direct our lives. And our
lives will not all be taken as equally good, no matter the neutrality feigned.
When we study well-being, we want our lives to go well in speciﬁc ways,
not just to think about questions impartially.7
This obsession with neutrality and meta-conversations is tired.8
Philosophers constantly try to ascend everyday messiness; they claw at
mountains hoping for higher ground to survey the valleys. But I fear
we’ve climbed so high that altitude sickness afﬂicts us. These impulses
for higher ground, at best, lead to few insights, and at worst, distract from
important matters. To warn against this urge, Richard Rorty advised that
we should look for “toeholds” on the trails of life, not “skyhooks” that
carry us upward (1991a, p. 14; 1991b, p. 38). That is, when facing the
jumble of incompatible theories, we can’t ﬁnd a neutral ground, and we
can’t expect heavenly intervention to lift us out of the problems. Instead,
when climbing our own ethical mountains, we should focus on our footing,
and we shouldn’t fantasize about nebulous escapes.9
I feel Piper’s unrest and perplexity at the literature. But rather than
hold out hope for a better deﬁnition, I wonder whether we haven’t found
answers because the questions and investigative methods are impotent.
Critics might be frustrated that I didn’t use conceptual analysis or metalevel discourse. But my point is that those very tools constructed the
labyrinth we’re now in. If we use those same tools, we fortify its walls
and convolute its patterns. That’s ﬁne if you enjoy life in the trap. But I
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prefer life outside. So, if we know that abstraction leads nowhere, and that
stipulation is the only other available method, I welcome the latter. And
I understand it as proper motivation for problem solving rather than as a
horn in Piper’s dilemma.10
Notes
“Well-being,” “goodness for” and “prudential goodness” are roughly
synonymous on Piper’s account. Piper carefully shows that traditional ways of
disambiguating “well-being” just won’t work. Contrasting prudential goodness
with other types of goodness doesn’t work (e.g. vs. intrinsic goodness, aesthetic
goodness, or goodness relative to some perfectionist standard). And providing
rough synonyms (e.g. “welfare”) doesn’t either (Sec. III).
2
Throughout, I will use “stipulative” to refer to this horn of the dilemma.
“Stipulative,” strictly, seems too narrow to describe the philosophers who
begin with thick, irreducibly normative theories. But the label contrasts with
the generalist tendencies of the other horn of the dilemma. Most important for
my point here is that “stipulative” thinkers start out by theorizing with concrete,
particular, deﬁnitive values or frameworks that only they and their sympathizers
would agree to. They don’t try to ﬁnd some more universal, general, or abstract
ground for discussion. Piper sees derides this as vicious question begging. I
disagree.
3
Piper also seems to think it’s a problem that stipulative thinkers open
themselves to reductiones ad absurdum and prima facie disputes (sec. VI). But
this seems a strange worry. Philosophers are open to these problems no matter
what. And as Marcus Aurelius says, “If anyone can refute me—show me I’m
making a mistake or looking at things from the wrong perspective—I’ll gladly
change. It’s the truth I’m after, and the truth never harmed anyone. What harms
us is to persist in self-deceit and ignorance” (2003, vi.21). Taking a personal stand
and having personal stakes in the debate aren’t necessarily downsides. They’re
proper motivation for getting things right.
Additionally, I assume Piper doesn’t want to make the tragic point: all
discussions of well-being are doomed to ambiguity and ineffectiveness, and
there’s nothing we can do about it. This would lead to quietism or cynicism,
neither of which I detect in Piper’s work.
4
One notable exception to Piper’s tendency against pluralism is his mention
of hybrid theories of well-being (sec. II).
5
The debate Piper references in well-being mirrors the debates between
moral particularists and generalists/universalists. For example, see the work
of Jonathan Dancy for a particularist defense (esp. 2004) and R.M. Hare for a
universalist defense (esp. 1963).
6
Maybe we can take inspiration from Friedrich Nietzsche in discussions on
well-being. Nietzsche asks us to integrate every aspect of our lives into a coherent
style, “To ‘give style’ to one’s character—a great and rare art! It is practiced by
those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses that their nature has to offer
1
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and then ﬁt them into an artistic plan until each appears as art and reason and even
weaknesses delight the eye. … In the end, when the work is complete, it becomes
clear how it was the force of a single taste that ruled and shaped everything great
and small—whether the taste was good or bad means less than one may think; it’s
enough that it was one taste! …” ([1887] 2001, §290, pp. 163-4).
7
Aristotle puzzled about meta-worries too. Feeling the pressure for precision
surrounding the deﬁnition of “goodness” on his way to deﬁning “happiness,” he
reminds his readers that, “some in fact have perished because of wealth, others
because of courage” (2002, 1094b18-20). In other words, he reemphasizes the
practical stakes of conversations about happiness, as some literally die degrading
deaths because of the things they value. Aristotle was dialectical, surveying
extant opinions. But he wasn’t neutral because he knew ethics, politics, and wellbeing are mortal concerns.
It’s also crucial to stress that the practical emphasis doesn’t mean we need to
resort to actionism or hasty judgments. Rather, the practical stakes should serve
to question the goal of neutrality itself. Neutrality gives us nothing if it can’t
reconnect with practical concerns.
Here, I’m also assuming that Piper isn’t exclusively after instrumental goods,
like publishing more articles about well-being or starting new academic debates
for the sake of monographs and anthologies. No doubt, these are goods and can
impact the practical lives of contemporary academics. But the debate seems to
aim at something more.
8
Kant wanted an authoritative morality that bound people categorically and
absolutely, no matter empirical differences. So, he constructed a metaphysical and
epistemological bargaining table ([1785] 1983, AK389). And British utilitarians
recoiled against the casuistry of lawyers, so they invented impartial formulae (e.g.
Sidgwick, [1906] 1981, esp. p. 99). I take this strategy of ascent and neutrality as
Piper’s main tactic in sec. V.
9
I worry that the philosophical instinct to ascend empirical realities,
especially as seen in philosophers like Kant, will lead to oppression. From such
stellar vantages, morality gets reduced to ‘dignity’ or ‘categorical imperatives,’
and those abstractions will survive despite blatantly racist or harmful attitudes
that such philosophers hold when judging real people and real-world events.
These harms are largely ignored too, rather than dealt with directly (see: Mills,
2014).
In the well-being literature, I hope we can avoid Kant’s fate. I think part of
the solution is making sure differences don’t disappear and that many lives are
represented in our works. That way, we won’t lose important features of our
lives that affect not only the ways we live, but the ways we think about things.
Audre Lorde warned against white feminism and its erasure of difference for the
same reasons. She recommended that feminists begin to notice that, “Difference
must be not merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities between
which our creativity can spark like a dialectic” ([1979] 2007, p. 111), adding
later, “Difference is the raw and powerful connection from which our personal
power is forged” ([1979] 2007, p. 112). Semantic ascent and further abstraction
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should be met with skepticism, especially in ethics and politics where real lives
are purported to be discussed or affected. I’m not equating ambiguity of metawell-being studies to the eraser of important differences between people. I’m
warning, however, that such ascents can lead to problems.
10
The labyrinth parallels Wittgenstein’s point about philosophy showing the
ﬂy the way out of the ﬂy-bottle ([1953] 2001, §309). The point that tools rarely
betray their makers is another reference to Lorde ([1979] 2007, p. 112). I don’t
agree fully with Wittgenstein and Lorde, but their warnings are good to heed here.
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